This is the second part of the blog discussing the Indian defence budget for the year 2025-26. It will discuss the major details of R&D and Kaveri jet engine problems and the weapons procurement procedure.
Whenever a country purchases foreign defence equipment, there are clauses for technology transfer. Even if you get the transfer of technology, the blueprint, and help in the assembly line for the system, if one wants to make some changes to the weapons system, they need to go to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). There are many reports from the CAG and the parliamentary standing committee for defence, which state how expensive it is for the country to seek upgrades. Most people have the perception that when we buy foreign equipment, it will be the best, that foreign countries specialising in certain fields will provide cutting edge equipment e.g. Germany being known for their industrial might, and that platforms bought will be the top of the line such as the P8I Neptune aircraft for anti-submarine activities.
But there is a caveat to it, countries that produce & sell military equipment will not sell equipment or technology that they use for themselves. The F117 Nighthawk was the first 5th-generation fighter aircraft developed by the USA, but due to the presence of sensitive technologies used for creation, it cannot be exported to NATO members. Creating your systems and sub-systems for weapons is comparatively cheaper (and possibly better than imports) and can be procured in bulk quantities. There is a famous saying, “Quantity has a quality of its own”. One thing we learned from the Russia-Ukraine war is that upcoming wars won't be as swift as previous wars, such as Operation Desert Storm or the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. Future wars are likely to be protracted and will require unrestricted access to military technology & equipment.
Two terms are famous in R&D, technological know-how and technological know-why. Technological know-how refers to the practical knowledge of operating and troubleshooting a system, which can be gained through manuals, blueprints or training. Technological know-how means the understanding of the science behind why the principle behind how and why a system works. It can only come from original research, testing and innovation. Think of a refrigerator. If you know how to operate it, adjust the temperature, and fix common issues by following a manual, that’s technological know-how. But if you understand why the refrigerator cools — how the refrigerant absorbs heat, the role of the compressor, and the thermodynamics behind the cooling cycle — that’s technological know-how.
In 1986, the Government of India (GOI) had sanctioned $1 billion (₹1,260 crore) to the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) for the creation of a jet engine. The GOI was under the expectation that it would integrate this engine, called the Kaveri engine, into the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) program. The 2011 CAG report, named ‘Inordinate Delay in Fruition of Kaveri Engine’, disclosed many key shortcomings and recommendations. The funding had 3 major objectives: i) design of a jet engine to meet the requirement for the LCA, ii) establish the country's indigenous base to design and develop critical jet engine technology, iii) test beds (testing facility for jet engines). The report highlighted how the project went over budget on numerous occasions and also failed in keeping the engine below the expected weight criteria.
To date, Rs 2035.56 crore has been used for the engine’s development. As of 2025, the latest update is that we have taken the Kaveri engine to Russia for high-altitude testing. The engine weight has been reduced to 1180 kg. The dry thrust is about 49kn, and with afterburners it comes to approximately 73 kn, noticeably below the requirement for the Tejas LCA, which is 80kn. In its “dry” configuration, the Kaveri engine dispenses with an afterburner, simplifying the design and eliminating the intense infrared plume that reheat produces. While afterburning engines can boost thrust, the extra heat they generate cannot be completely masked from modern IRST (infrared search-and-track) sensors—no amount of signature suppression can fully erase that hot exhaust. In contrast, a dry jet engine operates cooler, with a much-reduced heat signature; a feature more commonly found on commercial airliners and essential for any truly stealthy platform. That stealth advantage is precisely why DRDO has selected the dry Kaveri variant for its Ghatav Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV). Although the dry engine’s thrust—around 49 kN—falls short of the 80 kn needed for the Tejas LCA (and would rise to roughly 73 kn with reheat), it is perfectly adequate for a lighter, unmanned deep‑strike and reconnaissance aircraft. By forgoing an afterburner, Ghatav can approach enemy airspace with minimal infrared detectability, marrying indigenous jet‑engine development to the stringent demands of next‑generation stealth missions.
However, the absence of adequate funding for essential infrastructure, such as high-altitude test facilities, flying test beds, and advanced machinery like isothermal presses, 5-axis CNC machines, and vacuum furnaces, is hindering the development of jet engines that can deliver the required thrust for the LCA Tejas. As of April 2025, the time of this article, the country still doesn't have a high-altitude testing facility. To solve this issue, engines are taken to Russia for testing. According to the 2011 CAG report on the jet engine, ₹1600 crore is required for a high-altitude test facility for a jet engine. The current DRDO chief, Dr Sameer V Kamat, has said in an interview, “India has all the necessary technology needed to develop a 110 kn engine, but the time required, testing the engine, and proper infrastructure will take the country about 10 to 12 years and $4 to $5 billion". Any country that does a project in high-end engineering, be it civilian or military, will experience cost & time overruns.
India’s procurement machinery has long been bogged down by protracted timelines, excessive red tape and an ad‑hoc approach that undermines strategic capability building. To clear these roadblocks, the Defence Acquisition Wing has rolled out a streamlined, multi‑stage process that both enforces clear timelines and incentivises local industry. It starts with tri‑service identification of operational requirements, followed by a Request for Information (RFI) to map vendor capabilities and shape the Service Qualitative Requirement (SQR). Once the SQR is finalised, the eleven‑member Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) grants an Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) and classifies the buy as “Buy Indian – IDDM” or “Buy Global.” Shortlisted firms then receive a Request for Proposal (RFP), submit technical and commercial bids, and undergo field trials. Finally, contracts are awarded to the lowest responsive bidder (L1). By embedding accountability and promoting indigenous design at every step, this framework aims to slash cycle times and cut through bureaucratic inertia, paving the way for a more self‑reliant, strategically aligned procurement ecosystem.
To conclude, for a 2.5 front war situation, one cannot have an ad-hoc mindset for weapons procurement but rather must think long term and consider budget constraints. It is easy to say the defence budget should be around 2 to 3 percent of GDP, considering the current global scenario, it is difficult, but not impossible. We can do this by increasing our tax base and making the government more efficient, but these are long-term decisions to make and not easy to do. If India manages to establish a program similar to IGMDP for major weapons systems, which we currently import, such as submarines, jet engines, marine engines, medium altitude long endurance, high altitude long endurance drones, naval aircraft, .etc.; it could revolutionise the country’s defence systems and make us truly ‘atma nirbhar’, i.e. self-reliant in defence technologies; with subsequent secondary effects on projecting power which would help us with negotiations in foreign and economic policy.
Sameer Chawla
