- Tagat, A. & Kapoor, H. (2017). The trust broker game: a three-player trust game with probabilistic returns and information asymmetry. Economics Discussion Papers, No 2017-33, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. Available at http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2017-33/file
This paper experimentally investigates trust and trustworthiness in a repeated and sequential three-player trust game with probabilistic returns and information asymmetry. It adds to the existing literature by combining experimental features from recent work in the trust game. We use random variations in the multiplier value, a third player without an initial endowment, undisclosed termination rules, and variations in information availability related to transactions. Our framework is novel in that the game continues even if the first player transfers no amount to the second player. Using participants from India, the results are broadly consistent with past evidence on the trust game. All players are more trusting when information of their transfers and earnings are made available to other players. The third player (termed the "trust broker") transfers a larger amount when information on transfers is disclosed to other players. We find that information availability leads to a significant increase in the trust broker’s reciprocity, as defined by the amount that is returned to Player 2. Social desirability, cultural contexts, and learning effects are discussed in terms of scope for future research.
- Kulkarni, S., Tagat, A., & Kapoor, H. (2016). An experimental investigation of intra-household resource allocation in rural India. Partnership for Economic Policy working paper series no. 2016-20. Nairobi, Kenya: PEP. Available at: https://www.pep-net.org/working-papers
This study aims to investigate intra-household bargaining outcomes elicited in an artefactual field experiment design where participants completed a purchase task of real commodities. Married couples separately expressed their initial preferences over commodities. The bargaining process in the experiment was exogenously introduced by sharing information about partners’ preferences in the treatment group. We hypothesized that the spouse with weaker bargaining position at the household level would consider the information of their partner’s preferences while making own consumption decisions more compared to their partner. Therefore, they may deviate from their own preferences when purchasing commodities. More than 230 married couples from two villages in the Tamil Nadu state of India participated in the experiment. It was observed that information about partners’ spending preferences resulted in reduced final allocations for female participants. However, the deviation was not significantly different from the original intention to spend. Therefore, information about partners’ preferences may not be an effective medium to elicit bargaining power in the context of jointly-consumed household commodities. Subgroup analyses were performed to identify any heterogeneous treatment effects.
Borooah, V. K., & Tagat, A. (2016). Political participation in rural India: A village-level study. In N. Schofield & G. Caballero (Eds.), State, institutions and democracy: Contributions of political economy. Geneva, Switzerland: Springer International. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-44582-3_7
If countries have a ‘unique selling point’ then India’s must surely be that, with over 700 million voters, it is the world’s largest democracy. Allied to this is the enthusiasm with which Indians have embraced the electoral process. The turnout in Indian national elections has been over 62% in 10 of the last 15 national elections with 66% of eligible voters voting the 2014 Lok Sabha (Parliamentary) elections; the last time that a US Presidential election came close to matching this was the 60% turnout in the 1968 election between Nixon and Humphrey. Against this backdrop, this paper uses village level data for India on individual voters to ask what are the factors which determine the probability of whether an individual votes? Is this probability greater for national compared to local elections? And is there evidence that people are more likely to vote today than they were in the past? Allied to these questions is another set of questions relating to the choice of candidates. What are the factors that make for women’s autonomy in voting, meaning that they voted without reference to their spouses’ instructions? What are the factors which contribute to people voting for candidates who are of their own caste that is, ‘group identity’ voting? And, lastly, what are the factors which contribute to people voting for candidates who have a reputation for honesty and fairness?
- Borooah, V. K., & Tagat, A. (2015). Political participation in rural India: a village-level study. Paper presented at IV International Conference on Political Economy and Institutions (ICOPEAI 2015), Baiona, Spain. Vigo: ERENEA.
- Tagat, A. (2017, October 11). Nudging economics forward: The Richard Thaler way. HT Mint, p. 19. Retrieved from http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/vHIslxuXUWkfcivec0l5TK/Nudging-economics-forward-the-Richard-Thaler-way.html
- Tagat, A. (2017, July 16). The endurance of Pokémon Go. Mint on Sunday. Retrieved from http://www.livemint.com/Sundayapp/6w7V1ygo7aYuannyLkGgxM/The-endurance-of-Pokmon-Go.html
- Tagat, A. & Kapoor, H. (2017, February 16). This government puts its money where its mouth is. HT Mint, p. 17. Retrieved from http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/vbAnMLTDYB4MjS926Rg7DP/This-government-puts-its-money-where-its-mouth-is.html
- Tagat, A. & Kapoor, H. (2017, January 24). MGNREGS and changing household decision-making: How the scheme has led to women empowerment. Firstpost. Retrieved from http://www.firstpost.com/business/mgnregs-and-changing-household-decision-making-how-the-scheme-has-led-to-women-empowerment-3217514.html
- Mahajan, K. (2016, December 28). Demonetisation alone won't stop black money in political funding; electoral reform needed. Firstpost. Retrieved from http://www.firstpost.com/politics/demonetisation-alone-wont-stop-black-money-in-political-funding-electoral-reform-needed-3177106.html
- Tagat, A. (2016, July 24). Behavioural science and Pokemon Go. Mint on Sunday. Retrieved from http://www.livemint.com/Sundayapp/RTNl9tnGLItwwLU4LuvRAN/Behavioural-science-and-Pokmon-Go.html
- Menon, S., & Tagat, A. (2016, March 8). Nudging India forward: Setting up a nudge unit. Mint. Retrieved from http://www.livemint.com/Politics/nlDZwTwdUE1nZqPRxORHeJ/Nudging-India-forward-Setting-up-a-nudge-unit.html
- Tagat, A., & Kapoor, H. (2016, March 1). Jaitley's budget speech: Which words used more, which ones left out? [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://swarajyamag.com/economy/jaitleys-budget-speech-which-words-used-more-which-ones-left-out
- Rao, S., & Tagat, A. (2016, February 23). Nudging India forward: The case for a nudge unit in India. Mint. Retrieved from http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/bjzB67qBSiPHgw67szrhvL/Nudging-India-forward-The-case-for-a-nudge-unit-In-India.html
- Rao, S., & Tagat, A. (2016, February 17). India's nudge unit: An idea whose time has come. Mint. Retrieved from http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/DAzJfdnfgHFOXdKWPI68QM/Indias-nudge-unit-An-idea-whose-time-has-come.html
- Kapoor, H., & Tagat, A. (2015, December 20). Bigg Boss: Television's biggest social experiment? Mint on Sunday.
- Tagat, V. & Tagat, A. (2015, June 2). How do we fund our farmer producer organisations? [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://swarajyamag.com/economy/how-do-we-fund-our-farmer-producer-organizations/
- Tagat, A., & Kapoor, H. (2015, May 7). The budget speech: What does it really say [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://swarajyamag.com/economy/the-budget-speech-what-does-it-really-say/
- Tagat, A. (2014, November 6). Jugaad: The state of published research in India [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://swarajyamag.com/featured/jugaad-the-state-of-published-research-in-india/